(1) If European courts apply and interpret international law in one way, the risk arises that other courts -be they international tribunals or national courts outside Europe --take a different view. This could be seen as a threat to the unity of international law (Section II).
(2) Similarly, a distinct European approach to international law raises the specter of fragmentation, in particular, a European versus an American view of international law (Section III).
The fact that we Europeans even ask the question -i.e., does a European model of international law threaten the unity of the international system? --unearths a more fundamental underlying current in European international law circles: A post-modern anxiety to openly defend and export a "European" model of international law. GLOBAL RULES (2005) , recounting his visit to Tehran University and talk there about the Pinochet case. Sands decided to simply recount the facts of the case for fear that "the Court's decision not to recognize Pinochet's claim to immunity would be taken as a further example of the colonialist/imperialist tendency endemic in British culture, including its legal culture, and an inability to refrain from meddling in the internal affairs of Chile, another state"(at 223). To Sands' great surprise, however, in students' reactions to the talk, "criticism was directed not at the House of Lords but at me, why did I not embrace the case as a great moment for international law and the cause of human rights? ... It was striking that international law had provided a common language to explore complex moral and political issues faced by just about every country in the world" (at 224). Similarly, talk about human rights or environmental protection in the world of international trade is too often and easily portrayed as a Northern hegemonic agenda imposed on poor Southern countries. But clearly, even if such talk is at times thinly disguised protectionism, it is not as if developing countries are waiting to violate human rights or have a value-system or unstoppable urge to torture or enslave their people and to pollute their surroundings.
In the United States, in contrast, defense of national interests and a US model of international law are unabashedly pursued. 4 The fact that the United States, including its courts, might thereby exert a distinct influence on international law is seen as a plus, even a goal, not a threat to the "unity" of international law. 5 Witness recent discussions in the United States on the Alien Tort Statute 6 and the application of international law by the US Supreme Court. 7 Both debates center on the extent to which international law encroaches on US sovereignty. That "American" applications of international law might threaten the "unity" of international law is never mentioned. REVIEW (2005) 328 at 331 ("the United States needs to take its commitment to the rule of law to the global stage, thereby playing to American strengths, enhancing American legitimacy and moral authority, and perpetuating the leadership role that the United States has historically exercised in the conduct of international affairs. As the hegemon presiding over-and benefiting the most from-the global economy, the United States has both a vital interest in maintaining the stability of that system and a responsibility to ensure that the system is fair"). 6 When, for example, the scope of the Alien Tort Statute is discussed in US legal academia, the pros and cons of American courts enforcing international law at the request of aliens and mostly against aliens center around the language and history of the statute, US federalism and constitutional law and US national interests in the world, not the risk of US courts expressing a distinct view of international law and thereby disproportionately contributing to the future of international law and threatening its "unity". With sovereignty concerns in mind, and to facilitate acceptance of international norms on as wide a base as possible, international law has always accepted a degree of discretion when it comes to its implementation in domestic law (witness the freedom of nations to adopt either a monist or a dualist approach). The risk of inconsistent interpretations fits within this long-recognized discretion.
To argue that, for unity's sake, the interpretation of international law should be the exclusive domain of international courts and tribunals is, therefore, more of a hegemonic project to defend the turf of international lawyers against the intrusion of domestic actors 16 , than an agenda to defend international law as such. 17 It reminds one of the human rights activist arguing against the application of human rights treaties by WTO panels 18 , or of the ICJ judge crying foul at the creation of specialized international 15 This calculus from a standpoint other than that of international law (e.g., looked at from the perspective of domestic law) may, of course, be different. Weighing concerns of democratic legitimacy and balance of powers pointed at earlier, one may well conclude not to give direct effect to international law. See supra note 12. 16 When P.-J. Kuijper (EC Commission official and former Director at the WTO) emphasizes the existence of a distinct WTO dispute mechanism and the threat of inconsistent interpretations as arguments to deny direct effect of WTO law in the ECJ (see supra note 13), one could, indeed, be excused to think that by submitting such arguments he tries to protect the power of the EC Commission against ECJ interference, and to keep the WTO level (where the EC Commission enjoys extensive powers and discretion) distinct and separate from the domestic EC legal system (where the Commission is subject to more stringent checks and balances). The same could be said about A. Rosas' Annotation, supra note 13 (written at a time where he was still an EC Commission official, not an ECJ judge as he now is). Recall, however, that the present author is skeptical about giving direct effect to WTO law, but not because of an alleged risk of inconsistent interpretations (see note 12 That reference to international law may occasionally lead to inconsistent rulings on the same question of international law is not necessarily the end of the system of international law. On the contrary, it may be an engine for reflection, refinement and further development of international law. After all, in domestic legal systems as well, different lower courts may issue inconsistent interpretations on the same question of domestic law and it often takes years or decades for the highest court to intervene, the court often waiting until the discussion has sufficiently matured.
The absence of a preliminary or advisory ruling system, linking domestic courts to the relevant international tribunal, may lack the clarity and hierarchical structure of the internal European system (where national courts of the member states can request preliminary rulings on questions of EC law from the ECJ). At the same time, the unstructured interaction between domestic and international courts, and domestic courts amongst themselves, avoids supremacies that are carved in stone and enables a healthy judicial competition in which the best interpretation is likely to surface (along the lines of "regulatory competition" or the "laboratory of ideas" tolerated, even encouraged, in the 50 states of the US).
In addition, preliminary references by national courts from, potentially, 190 countries to, control the compliance by EC institutions with the ECHR on the premise that EU members, who all ratified the ECHR, cannot evade their obligations through the EC.
In the end, the idea of an organic, interactive dialogue between courts may be too much for traditionally trained European civil lawyers who regard hierarchy and strict divisions of competence as the hallmarks of any legal system worth that name. The approach may be more palatable, though, for common law lawyers. This brings me to the next level of this paper, namely the apparent or real contrast between a European and an American approach to international law and its impact on the unity of international law. 27 See, most eloquently, the dissents by Justice Scalia in Roper v. Simmons ("Though the views of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the Court's decision today, the views of other countries and the socalled international community take center stage ... More fundamentally, however, the basic premise of the Court's argument-that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world-ought to be rejected out of hand") and Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain ("The notion that a law of nations, redefined to mean the consensus of states on any subject, can be used by a private citizen to control a sovereign's treatment of its own citizens within its own territory is a 20th-century invention of internationalist law professors and human-rights advocates ... We Americans have a method for making the laws that are over us. We elect representatives to two Houses of Congress, each of which must enact the new law and present it for the approval of a President, whom we also elect. constraints for granted and often make abstraction of politics and power. In Europe, the need for cooperation and international governance is a given, the question is only how best to legitimize it. In this exercise many Europeans see the need to "constitutionalize" international law in pursuit of the Kantian ideal of cosmopolitan law separated from politics as far as possible (hence, what I call the European normative approach to international law).
III. Is There
In the United States, in contrast, the academic picture is quite different. With limited exceptions, the debate of whether international law is really law remains as hot as ever. , adding at 1-2: "The depth of the support for citing foreign sources of law suggests that the movement to do this is just beginning and will only gather force over time. In the wake of Simmons, the debate on the Court is no longer over whether to cite foreign sources of law but over when and how to cite them. This portends a sea change in the Court's doctrine". 40 Bolton, supra note 28, at 9 (emphasis added).
position. Indeed, both the founding fathers of the EC and the US expressed very strong commitments to the international legal system.
At the time it was concluded, the Treaty of Rome was after all a treaty part of, and concluded under, international law. Article 300.7 of the EC Treaty confirmed, for the purposes of "domestic" EC law, the binding nature of treaties concluded by the EC with other countries. In early ECJ case law, moreover, the Court granted direct effect to treaties concluded by the EC (Haegeman, 1974 and Kupferberg, 1982) and recognized the supremacy of international treaties over EC and member states' legislation.
In the US, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution explicitly states that, together with the Constitution itself and US federal law, "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land". This the Community was still a relatively weak actor on the international stage". In their view,
Kupferberg was a typical product of a certain period, in which the Community had just started to win its position in international relations ... In such a relatively weak position it is often seen as safest to be closely guided by (international) law. And this seemed all the more obvious, because this was (still) the period in which the Court clearly held a dominant position among the institutions.
Indeed, by giving direct effect and supremacy to treaties concluded by the Community, the ECJ not only increased its own powers. It also elevated the Community institutions as a whole in their power struggle with the member states, especially by highlighting the Community as an actor on the international scene capable of concluding treaties with direct effect and supremacy in the domestic legal systems of the member states.
Explaining, in turn, the US Supremacy Clause, Carlos Vazquez submits that "the repeated violations of treaties by the states [in particular, the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain] was a prime concern of the Framers who gathered in Philadelphia". He hastens to add, however, that it was merely one facet of a more general problem: the Articles [of Confederation, preceding the US Constitution] lacked a mechanism for enforcing any of the acts of the central Government, or the Articles themselves. The absence of such a mechanism was a principal reason for the Framers' decision to draft a new Constitution rather than amend the Articles.
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In other words, the US Constitution's strong commitment to treaties was inspired, first, by an attempt to impose federal authority over the states and, second, to avert international friction caused by the newly created US, in particular violations of treaties by states which would be attributable to the federal US.
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In sum, when relatively weak on the international scene and pressed to establish one's powers against competing internal forces, it should come as no surprise that actors strongly commit to international law, first, to gain respect in, and protection from, the international community, second, to utilize the international scene as a platform for the aggrandizement of one's own identity and powers.
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Consider how much this situation has changed since those early founding years, both in the EC and in the US.
Summarizing the case law on the question of "direct effect" of WTO law before the ECJ (especially after Portugal v. Commission), Piet Eeckhout concludes that the EC system can now safely be defined as "dualist". 45 At the same time, the ECJ continues to give direct effect to other treaties, including economic association agreement and preferential agreements such as the Lome Convention. For Bronckers and Kuijper the reasons for this evolution are clear:
it can be questioned, twenty years on [i.e., after Kupferberg in 1982], whether some of these answers [giving direct effect and supremacy to treaties] were not too much focused on matters of principle, and in fact belittled issues that only the larger, more powerful Member States (France!), which were more exposed to international power politics, were aware of ... 44 Note, however, the somewhat contradictory argument that the rejection of international law by the ECJ in certain early cases can be seen as an attempt to distinguish the EC regime from ordinary international law and thereby to confirm the "separate legal order" and identity of the EC. Timmermans, for example, argues that the ECJ's initial reticence to apply customary international law in Dyestuffs (1972) can largely be explained from its efforts to safeguard the autonomy of Community law vis-à-vis international law. See C. Timmermans, "The EU and Public International Law", 4 European Foreign Affairs Review (1999), 181-194, at 181-183 . In my view, the force of this argument is rather limited, in particular to the systemic issue of defining the EC treaty as setting up a separate, quasi-domestic legal order (first proclaimed in Van Gendt & Loos), which is distinct from the substantive question of commitment by the EC to international law. Moreover, the argument does not explain the opposite move in the ECJ's reception of treaties, All this has now changed. The Community has become an important factor in international relations. Particularly in the WTO, where it was 'present at the creation' and so an 'original Member', it has become a significant power and is also itself better capable of standing up to the power politics of others. Moreover, the Court's position in relation to the other institutions within the Community has changed. In this situation, an adjustment of the Kupferberg case law, particularly regarding the WTO, is understandable and necessary.
Explaining the continued reception of so-called asymmetric treaties (such as the Lome Convention) or closer integration agreements (such as association agreements and FTAs), Rosas refers to the EC's relatively strong power position in these specific treaty settings:
granting the latter types of bilateral agreements direct effect is much easier even if the other Contracting Party does not reciprocate, as first of all it has been the intention of the EU to grant its special partner some specific rights and advantages, and secondly as the EU would in any case have the economic and political means to encourage compliance by the other Contracting Party. Indeed, in the US, rather than directly incorporating treaties as the supreme law of the land (as envisaged in the Supremacy Clause), the presumption is now that treaties are not In sum, the reception of international law both in the EC and the US started from strikingly similar (monist-like) positions. Moreover, the current EC and US positions continue to share very similar preoccupations with power relations, sovereignty, democratic legitimacy and balance of powers between the judiciary and the executive/legislature to deny direct effect to international law (both gradually moving to a dualist-type conception). Driving this argument to its extreme, the main difference between them is, in the end, that the EC is powerful in only a limited set of circumstances 
Biotech Inventions case) and (albeit with limitations) customary international law (in

Racke and Opel Austria).
Put differently, when Europe talks of its commitment to international law, or heralds the supremacy and direct effect of international law, it may partly be doing so based on its normative, idealist approach to international law. However, another explanatory factor is that Europe speaks from a position of relative weakness and is, therefore, quite keen to see everyone (including its more powerful partners) commit to international constraints.
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In addition, as the EC is not a sovereign state but remains an international institution with strict internal controls by its member states also when the EC operates externally, for the EC to commit itself even to WTO constraints (where the EC does speak from a powerful position) is relatively easy: as the EC is already committed to principles of transparency and non-discrimination through its internal structure, it is easier to accept the same constraints as they are imposed from Geneva, especially if it means that the EC's trading partners will do the same and thus operate from an equal level playing field. The EC, despite the fact that it enjoyed at that time exclusive competence in external trade ... has not always been capable, from a structural and internal organizational point of view, of exploiting effectively this power, especially when countermeasures and retaliatory action were contemplated ... EU action in the external trade field is, more frequently than not, based on the lowest common denominator of the positions expressed by the Member States or it takes a considerably long period of time to be framed and adopted. Powerful third countries, like the US, could fairly easily apply the "divide and rule" strategy to bring standstill in, and even destroy the cohesion of, the decision-making process in the Council.
54 See Christoforou and Rosas (ibid.):
issues of transparency, legitimacy and good governance are raised quite frequently and with even more rigor against trade measures and actions proposed by the European Commission for adoption by the EU ... There is little doubt, therefore, that these internal structural and organizational problems have played and still continue to play a prominent role in constraining EU's behavior internationally ... It appears, therefore, that for the EU, in order to be able to complete effectively its mission internally and still be an efficient international player, there was a greater need to rely more frequently on consensual policy making and the rule of law. This is considered necessary in order to balance the divergent trade and economic interests and rally the support of its Member States, as it cannot apply in its internal decision-making process pure power politics. In other words, the EU was and still is in a much greater need of an international trade regime that is based on principles, norms, rules, and judicial supervision, for both internal and external legal reasons, than individual nation states.
Conversely, in the United States power relations and domestic sovereignty are not the only factors at play. In the US, much like in Europe, a prominent place remains reserved for normative impulses and value-laden references to, for example, the ideal of individual freedom or the international community (as in recent US Supreme Court rulings referring to, for example, "norms of international character accepted by the civilized world" 55 or
Bush's reference in the Avena determination to "general principles of comity").
In short, Europe and the United States play the same game, within the same framework and with the same reflexes. Differences in their position have to do more with relative strength and constitutional framework, than substantive transatlantic disagreements.
The search for a middle ground between the normative European and the transactional American approach: a research agenda
The previous section illustrates that, though theoretically appealing, the divide between European idealism (normativism) and American realism (transactionalism) is less outspoken in practice. Europe has demonstrated a healthy dose of realism itself (witness, in particular, the ECJ case law on the effect of WTO law), and the US is not, and has never been, an antithesis to international law (witness its historical role since World War II, the surge of references to international law by the US Supreme Court and the Bush foreign affairs agenda centered around Kantian ideals of freedom).
Nonetheless, the juxtaposition of a European and an American approach to international law remains analytically useful. It can serve as a framework within which to critically assess the two extremes of idealism and realism and to find a balanced middle ground between them.
55 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.
Consider, for example, the risk of inconsistent interpretations discussed in Section II.
The normative European approach validly raises this concern (a non-issue in American transactionalism). Yet, the normative approach may go too far and sacrifice a less than homogenous application of international law only to safeguard the system's sacred unity and hierarchical relation to domestic legal systems. American transactionalism -in particular, concepts such as "regulatory competition" -can temper this extreme and lead to the proposals suggested in this paper centered around the notion of judicial tolerance.
Equally, the question of whether to give direct effect to international law, discussed in Section III, would receive a resounding yes under the European normative extreme:
international law is legally binding, so what is the problem with giving effect to it in domestic courts? Such principled position -though raising valid points of moral commitment and legal predictability -must, however, be tempered by the democratic legitimacy and balance of powers concerns of the transactional, American approach to international law. This should happen, however, without falling into the extreme of this transactional approach (such as construing international and domestic law as hermetically sealed-off compartments or denying any legally binding effect to international law).
This research agenda is, in my view, one of the greatest challenges for us international lawyers in the 21 st century. Rather than threatening the unity of international law, it is absolutely necessary to pursue this agenda -including a more outspoken European agenda -to preserve the long-term integrity of the international legal system. As Anne-
Marie Slaughter put it in 2002:
If the U.S. can recognize that international law does have a crucial role to play and the EU can recognize that many traditional international rules and institutions must now be modernized, they have a tremendous opportunity to work together to strengthen the global legal order.
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IV. Conclusions
The application of international law by domestic courts does not threaten the unity of international law. The risk of inconsistent interpretations, or one national court applying international law inconsistently with other national courts or the relevant international tribunal, is not a reason to deny application of international law before domestic courts.
There may be other reasons to do so, based on democratic legitimacy, internal balance of powers or reciprocity with other nations. Yet, the risk of fragmentation or inconsistent interpretations is not one of them.
From the perspective of international law, the risk of inconsistent interpretations is far outweighed by the benefits of a more effective international law. In addition, it may have a bright side, namely the refinement and further development of international law through "judicial competition". The multitude of layers and concerns raised by today's format of international governance are too complex to be constrained in strict hierarchies and preliminary reference schemes. Instead, judicial curiosity, dialogue and tolerance are the best recipe to nurture the integrity and further development of international law.
Courts can, in particular, avoid inconsistent interpretations by referring to the rulings of international tribunals and requesting expert advice from international organizations.
Moreover, when serious inconsistencies do persist, other treaty parties can challenge the national court practice before the relevant international tribunal. Calls for either strict unity (for example, to reserve WTO interpretations to the WTO level alone) or selfcontained fragmentation (for example, for the ECJ or WTO panels to reject any reference to international law allegedly to maintain their autonomy) can easily be reduced to hegemonic projects.
In turn, the definition and pursuit of a European agenda or European approach to international law does not threaten the unity of international law. Rather than negative attacks on how other nations (read: the United States) should not approach international law, Europe must offer its own, positive agenda on how to view and refine the international system. Europe must shed its reluctance to define, and aggressively pursue, this agenda based on European values and interests. Doing so will remind everyone how much Europe and America continue to have in common. Indeed, when scratching the surface of today's conventional wisdom of Europe as the defender of international law and America as its antithesis, the attitudes, mental framework and reflexes as well as prevailing concerns are strikingly similar across the Atlantic. Both countries, in particular, have strongly committed to international law when relatively weak on the international scene and pressed to establish their powers against competing internal forces, first, to gain respect in, and protection from, the international community, second, to utilize the international scene as a platform for the aggrandizement of their own identity and powers. Most differences in approach are, therefore, explained not by inherent, substantive disagreements between Europe and the US, but rather by relative power positions and internal constitutional features.
Given those transatlantic similarities, one of the greatest challenges for us international lawyers in the 21 st Century will be to unearth these convergences and to find answers to the common questions of, for example, the democratic accountability and legitimacy of international law raised both in Europe and the US. This requires an appraisal of both the extremes of what I called the strictly normative approach to international law (European idealism) and the purely transactional view of international law (American realism). Yet, to maintain the long-term integrity of international law what is needed is a balanced middle ground between those two extremes.
